Ideas from 'Thought' by Gilbert Harman [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Thought' by Harman,Gilbert [Princeton 1977,0-691-01986-x]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

3099	Inference is never a conscious process

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

3077	Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

3092	If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

3093	Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

3098	Deductive logic is the only logic there is

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens

3094	You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

3081	A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form

3080	Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements

3084	Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism

3100	You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic

3089	Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic

3088	Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

3101	Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism

3074	People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence

3097	We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

6369	In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Pollock/Cruz]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

3096	Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

3095	Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self

3073	We see ourselves in the world as a map

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

3076	Defining dispositions is circular

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism

3075	Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

3086	Are there any meanings apart from in a language?

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

3078	Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy

3090	There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

3082	Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

3079	Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

3085	Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic

3087	The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

3083	Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely